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People can establish whether a sentence is hypothetically true even if what it describes can
never be literally true given the laws of the natural world. Two event-related potential
(ERP) experiments examined electrophysiological responses to sentences about unrealistic
counterfactual worlds that require people to construct novel conceptual combinations and
infer their consequences as the sentence unfolds in time (e.g., ‘‘If dogs had gills. . .’’). Exper-
iment 1 established that without this premise, described consequences (e.g., ‘‘Dobermans
would breathe under water . . .’’) elicited larger N400 responses than real-world true sen-
tences. Incorporation of the counterfactual premise in Experiment 2 generated similar
N400 effects of propositional truth-value in counterfactual and real-world sentences, sug-
gesting that the counterfactual context eliminated the interpretive problems posed by
locally anomalous sentences. This result did not depend on cloze probability of the sen-
tences. In contrast to earlier ﬁndings regarding online comprehension of logical operators
and counterfactuals, these results show that ongoing processing can be directly impacted
by propositional truth-value, even that of unrealistic counterfactuals.
 2012 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.Introduction
Wittgenstein (1958) famously argued that because lan-
guage use is fundamentally grounded in common patterns
of human behavior and cognition ‘‘If a lion could speak, we
could not understand him’’. His thought experiment illus-
trates the capacity to reason counterfactually about events
that can never realistically take place: we can consider
whether his abstruse conclusion is hypothetically true de-
spite knowing that what it describes can never be literally
true given the biological or physical laws of the world. But
does propositional truth-value impact our comprehension
of sentences, including ‘unrealistic’ counterfactuals, as they
unfold in time? This paper reports two event-related po-
tential (ERP) studies that investigated whether the lan-
guage processing system is immediately sensitive to the
truth-value of unrealistic counterfactual conditionals such. All rights reserved.as ‘‘If dogs had gills, Dobermans would breathe under
water’’.
Balancing our knowledge of what is true and possible in
the world with what we can experience in thought and ex-
press in language may be particularly taxing when we pro-
cess language with unrealistic content (as compared to,
let’s say, ﬁctional yet realistic content). Understanding an
unrealistic counterfactual sentence requires the creation
of an unusual conceptual combination (‘dogs’ and ‘gills’)
with potential consequences that go beyond what is liter-
ally stated (e.g., the hobby of keeping dogs as pets would
drastically change if they had gills instead of lungs).
Whereas the sentence ‘‘Dobermans would breathe under
water’’ by itself semantically anomalous, it may describe
a hypothetically true consequence of the counterfactual
premise. However, is our language comprehension system
immediately sensitive to its truth-value, as compared to
that of a more realistic sentence that draws upon our
pre-existing real-world knowledge (e.g., ‘‘Because ﬁsh have
gills, tuna breathe under water’’)? And does a plausible and
1 Word-by-word presentation is standard in ERP research to prevent eye-
movement-induced artefacts in the EEG signal (but see Dimigen et al.,
2011). However, because participants cannot backtrack as people do in
reading, the presentation rate is adjusted to allow participants to read
comfortably. Whereas standard word-by-word presentation is slower than
current estimates of natural reading pace, it elicits N400 effects that are
quantitatively and qualitatively similar to those found for auditory
presentation (e.g., Van Berkum, Zwitserlood, Hagoort, & Brown, 2003;
Van Berkum, Hagoort, & Brown, 1999). Importantly, speeded presentation
rates (e.g., 350 ms per word) are reported as uncomfortable and impair
sentence comprehension (e.g., Camblin et al., 2007).
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tual consequence and premise mitigate processing costs
associated with a sentence that is false with respect to
knowledge of the real-world?
This latter question resonates with classic empirical
questions regarding the interaction between local and glo-
bal levels of language comprehension (e.g., word- or
phrase-level versus discourse-level). Experimental results
suggest that supportive discourse context can mitigate
processing costs associated with phrases or sentences that
describe unexpected events (e.g., ‘‘the electrician taught
herself’’; Cook & Myers, 2004; Duffy & Keir, 2004; Hess,
Foss, & Carroll, 1995). According to the lexical reinterpreta-
tion model (e.g., Hess et al., 1995), discourse context mod-
iﬁes the representation of a concept to form the basis for
further interpretation (see also Zwaan & Radvansky,
1998). Such results testify to an interactive view of lan-
guage processing in which lexical, structural, and contex-
tual information interact efﬁciently as a message unfolds
(e.g., Marslen-Wilson, 1975), and are consistent with con-
textually-driven resolution (or preclusion) of syntactic
ambiguity (e.g., Altmann & Steedman, 1988) and lexical
ambiguity (e.g., Rayner, Cook, Juhasz, & Frazier, 2006),
and with the absence of additional processing costs for en-
riched expressions in supportive context (e.g., Gerrig &
Bortfeld, 1999; Gibbs, 1979; Traxler, McElree, Williams, &
Pickering, 2005). However, it is clear neither how much
discourse context is needed to modify an initial – or ‘de-
fault’ – interpretation, nor how explicit a context must
be. The current study aims to establish whether a single
supportive counterfactual clause can sufﬁce.
Whereas several studies have reported that contextual
relevance outweighs real-world constraints from an early
moment on (e.g., a cartoon-like story about an amorous
peanut can invert the relative ease of processing ‘‘the
peanut was salted’’ as compared to ‘‘the peanut in love’’,
Nieuwland & Van Berkum, 2006; see also Filik, 2008; Filik
& Leuthold, 2008), some results on the processing of
literally false or unrealistic sentences suggest that context
does not completely overrule brieﬂy disruptive effects of
local violations (e.g., Hald, Steenbeek-Planting, & Hagoort,
2007; Warren, McConnell, & Rayner, 2008). For example,
Warren et al. reported that despite a fantasy-context (e.g.,
Harry Potter practicing magic spells on food items), words
that incurred semantic violations (e.g., ‘bread’ in ‘‘Harry
used a book to teach the tough bread’’) elicited longer ﬁxa-
tions and gaze durations than in unproblematic sentences
(e.g., ‘‘Harry used a microwave to heat the tough bread’’).
These brief disruptions correspond with predictions from
the Bonding and Resolution framework (e.g., Garrod &
Terras, 2000) and ‘memory-based’ language processing
theories (e.g., Gerrig & O’Brien, 2005; Kintsch, 1988; Myers
& O’Brien, 1998) that initial processing is dominated by
local semantic relationships with effects of contextual
relevance or propositional truth-value emerging later.
There is little reason to believe that the reported dis-
crepancies stem from different techniques (for example,
if eye-tracking during reading were sensitive to early pro-
cesses that ERPs, in particular the N400 amplitude depen-
dent measure, are not). Ferguson, Sanford, and Leuthold
(2008) reported that early processing disruptions as in-dexed by increased ﬁrst-pass reading times but not in later
measures coincided with an increased N400. This is consis-
tent with observations that ﬁrst ﬁxation durations are cor-
related with N400 amplitude and that these measures are
sensitive to the same lexical and sentence variables (e.g.,
Dambacher & Kliegl, 2007; see Dimigen, Sommer, Hohlfeld,
Jacobs, & Kliegl, 2011, for in-depth discussion). Hence, ERPs
and eye-tracking can, in principle, be similarly sensitive to
the type of processing disruptions during language com-
prehension under study here, despite the fact that serial vi-
sual presentation as used in ERP research on sentence
reading is less natural than sentence reading eye-tracking.1
The reported discrepancies may, however, reﬂect differ-
ences between studies in how smoothly interpreting
incoming information is related to the context, perhaps
depending on how elaborate and explicit the discourse
context is (see Warren et al., 2008, for discussion). Warren
et al. created a variety of fantasy contexts that each made a
novel unrealistic event more plausible, but realistic contin-
uations were nevertheless on average more expected than
unrealistic continuations (for related discussion, see Mat-
suki et al., 2011). In contrast, Nieuwland and Van Berkum
(2006) created relatively uniform cartoon-like contexts
that always involved an inanimate object behaving like a
human being, and that each consisted of 4–5 sentences
containing repeated animacy violations. This experimental
manipulation strongly constrained the interpretation of
the critical phrases, but it begs the questions whether the
reported results were contingent upon repeated exposure
of similar anomalies on the same lexical item, as could
be argued from the lexical reinterpretation account (e.g.,
Hess et al., 1995), or whether they reﬂect expectations
based on the discourse genre and therefore carry over to
novel entities and events (e.g., Zwaan, 1994; see also
Gerrig & Murphy, 1992; Van Berkum, 2010). The current
studies address this by examining comprehension of
single-sentence counterfactual conditionals about events
that do not correspond with the natural world and that
require readers to incrementally compute the unrealistic
consequences of a counterfactual premise.
To understand counterfactual language requires that
people balance their factual knowledge about the world
with their readiness to engage in suspension of disbelief
(e.g., Searle, 1975). Counterfactual thought enables hu-
mans to decouple from reality (e.g., Cosmides & Tooby,
2000), yet may be organized along the same principles as
rational thought, and some aspects of reality are more
readily ‘undone’ than others (see Byrne, 2007, for review).
People do not usually create ‘‘miracle-world’’ counterfactu-
als but generate plausible alternatives to real-world
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less, the ability to generate and understand unrealistic
counterfactuals testiﬁes to the creative nature of our cogni-
tive endowment (e.g., Fauconnier & Turner, 2002).
Recent studies have looked at counterfactual language
comprehension using online measures (de Vega, Urrutia,
& Riffo, 2007; Ferguson, 2012; Ferguson & Sanford, 2008;
Ferguson, Scheepers, & Sanford, 2010; Ferguson et al.,
2008; Nieuwland & Martin, 2012; Stewart, Haigh, & Kidd,
2009; Urrutia, de Vega, & Bastiaansen, 2012). Ferguson
and Sanford (2008) showed that despite a counterfactual
context (e.g., ‘‘If cats were vegetarians’’) sentences describ-
ing implausible real-world events (e.g., ‘‘Families would
feed their cat a bowl of carrots’’) incurred brief disruptions
during reading (i.e., longer early ﬁxations in eye-tracking;
see also Ferguson et al., 2008, for N400 evidence), suggest-
ing that counterfactual context came into play after real-
world constraints had their effect (see Ferguson, Sanford,
& Leuthold, 2007, on the role of negation). However,
counterfactually consistent continuations had been rated
as less plausible than real-world continuations (3.6 and
4.6, respectively, out of 5-‘highly plausible’). Recent
eye-tracking results on comprehension of realistic
counterfactuals (e.g., ‘‘If it had rained this morning Susan
would have rushed to get to work. In the end, Susan arrived
at work early (inconsistent)/late (consistent). . .’’; Ferguson,
2012) suggest that readers do make factual inferences from
counterfactuals (i.e., that it had not rained that morning
and Susan had not rushed to work) yet maintain access
to both counterfactual and factual interpretations (as evi-
denced by anomaly detection responses for counterfactual
conditions compared to a factually consistent condition;
see also de Vega et al., 2007; Santamaria, Espino, & Byrne,
2005).
Results from a recent ERP study by Nieuwland and Mar-
tin (2012) suggest that real-world knowledge does not
modulate or delay the effect of propositional truth-value
on processing counterfactuals about commonly-known
historical events (e.g., ‘‘If NASA had not developed its Apol-
lo Project, the ﬁrst country to land on the moon would
have been Russia/America surely’’), as evidenced by re-
versed ERP patterns to the same lexical items as a function
of the context. Perhaps that these alternative endings are
easily computed because relevant information is part of
our existing real-world knowledge (e.g., of the ‘Space Race’
between the USA and the USSR). Theories of counterfactual
comprehension indeed assume that similarity between
counterfactual worlds and the real world facilitates coun-
terfactual reasoning (e.g., Byrne, 2007; Lewis, 1973;
McCall, 1984). Thus, one unresolved issue is whether sim-
ilar effects of propositional truth-value are observed when
unrealistic consequences need to be computed on-the-ﬂy.
For the example sentence ‘‘If dogs had gills, Dobermans
would breathe under water’’ the incremental interpreta-
tion involves the deduction that what holds for dogs holds
for Dobermans (see Johnson-Laird, 1999), and an inductive
inference regarding the potential consequences of a con-
ceptual combination of or blend between ‘dog’ and ‘gills’
(e.g., Coulson & Fauconnier, 1999; Lakoff, 1987; Springer
& Murphy, 1992; Turner & Fauconnier, 1998; see also Rips,
1975). Reasoning from this unrealistic conceptual combi-nation within one sentence provides a strong test of the
incremental contribution of counterfactual context.
The current hypotheses focused on the N400 (Kutas &
Hillyard, 1980, 1984), an ERP waveform whose amplitude
peaks at about 400 ms post-stimulus, with smaller ampli-
tudes indexing facilitated retrieval from semantic memory
as elicited by content words or other meaningful stimuli
(for reviews see Kutas & Federmeier, 2011; Kutas, Van Pet-
ten, & Kluender, 2006). N400 effect onset, when ERP wave-
forms corresponding to different conditions start to
diverge, is about 200–300 ms after visual word onset
(e.g., Kutas & Hillyard, 1980, 1984; Van Berkum et al.,
1999). With spoken words, N400 effects can start as early
as 100–200 ms after word onset (e.g., Van Berkum, Zwit-
serlood, Hagoort, & Brown, 2003), after having heard only
two or three phonemes and well before a word’s unique-
ness point (e.g., Van Petten, Coulson, Rubin, Plante, & Parks,
1999). These well-established observations suggest that
N400 effects that are elicited by words that are relatively
unexpected (e.g., Kutas & Hillyard, 1984; Van Berkum,
Brown, Zwitserlood, Kooijman, & Hagoort, 2005) or that
render sentences anomalous or false (e.g., Hagoort, Hald,
Bastiaansen, & Petersson, 2004; Nieuwland & Kuperberg,
2008), reﬂect routine sense-making processes by which
incoming words are related to the preceding context
(e.g., Hagoort and Van Berkum (2007) and Kutas et al.
(2006), for review). This involves retrieval from semantic
memory as facilitated by linguistic and non-linguistic con-
text and potentially intensiﬁed by attentional factors (see
Federmeier & Laszlo, 2009; Kutas & Federmeier, 2000,
2011; Van Berkum, 2009; see also Baggio & Hagoort,
2011; Lau, Phillips, & Poeppel, 2008; Van Petten & Luka,
2006, for accounts of the neurobiology underlying N400
phenomena). In two separate experiments, the current
study examined whether these processes are also sensitive
to counterfactual context and propositional truth-value. In
Experiment 1, participants read sentences that were anom-
alous with respect to real-world knowledge (e.g., ‘‘Dober-
mans would breathe under water’’). In Experiment 2,
new participants read these same sentences preceded by
a counterfactual conditional premise that rendered the ‘lo-
cally anomalous’ sentence true (e.g., ‘‘If dogs had gills,
Dobermans would breathe under water’’).
The aim of Experiment 1 was to establish that without a
counterfactual context, unrealistic consequences incurred
semantic processing costs as indexed by the N400, similar
to a real-world-false sentence compared to a true sentence
(e.g., ‘‘Tuna breathe under poison/water’’). This is not obvi-
ous due to potential processing differences related to verb
tense between counterfactual real-world control sentences
(conditional sentences had conditional verb tense, whereas
real-world sentences did not). Conditional verb tense
might mitigate the impact of propositional truth-value
during processing, although earlier results suggest that this
need not be the case (see Nieuwland & Martin, 2012).
Participants in Experiment 1 were native speakers of
Spanish who read counterfactual-true/false control sen-
tences and real-world-true/false control sentences (see
Table 1), which were derived from the sentences from
Experiment 2 (see Table 2). Critical words belonged to
word pairs (e.g., ‘water’ and ‘poison’) that were matched
Table 1
Example sentences and translations with average truth-value rating per condition in Experiment 1.
Condition Example sentences Truth-value
Counterfactual-true control Los Dóberman respirarían bajo el agua sin problemas 1.91 (0.80)
Una gota de sangre sería de color verde mayormente
Los tomates podrían crear adicción fácilmente
Dobermans would breathe under water without problems
A drop of blood would be the color green mainly
Tomatoes could cause addiction easily
Counterfactual-false control Los Dóberman respirarían bajo el veneno sin problemas 1.62 (0.70)
Una gota de sangre sería de color blanco mayormente
Los tomates podrían crear ilusión fácilmente
Dobermans would breathe under poison without problems
A drop of blood would be the color white mainly
Tomatoes could cause hope easily
Real-world-true control Los atunes respiran bajo el agua sin problemas 5.80 (1.02)
Una hoja de abeto es de color verde mayormente
Los cigarros pueden crear adicción fácilmente
Tuna breathe under water without problems
A ﬁr tree’s leaf is the color green mainly
Cigarettes can cause addiction easily
Real-world-false control Los atunes respiran bajo el veneno sin problemas 1.88 (0.85)
Una hoja de abeto es de color blanco mayormente
Los cigarros pueden crear ilusión fácilmente
Tuna breathe under poison without problems
A ﬁr tree’s leaf would be white mostly
Cigarettes can cause hope easily
Filler control En Europa la mayoría de países usa el euro
En España sólo el tabaco y el alcohol son legales
La bicicleta no contamina en absoluto
En Europe the majority of countries uses the euro
In Spain only tobacco and alcohol are legal
Bicycles do not pollute at all
Note: Standard deviations in parentheses. Critical words are underlined for expository purposes. For truth-value rating, 1 = False, 7 = True.
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full counterfactual conditional sentences (Experiment 2),
one word rendered both a counterfactual and a real-world
sentence true and that the other word rendered them both
false (e.g., Spanish equivalents of ‘‘If dogs had gills, Dober-
mans would breathe under water/poison without prob-
lems’’ and ‘‘Because ﬁsh have gills, tuna breathe under
water/poison without problems’’), as established in an
independent truth-value rating test. Moreover, an inde-
pendent cloze completion test was conducted to ensure
that the ‘true’ words were roughly equally predictable
from counterfactual contexts and real-world contexts,
whereas ‘false’ words received zero cloze values.
The control sentences in Experiment 1 were con-
structed by omitting the ﬁrst clause of the sentence, and
another truth-value rating test was performed to ensure
that participants would consider counterfactual control
sentences and real-world-false control sentences as false,
but real-world-true control sentences as true. The corre-
sponding prediction was that compared to real-world-true
control sentences, larger N400 responses would be ob-
served for counterfactual-true/false control sentences and
real-world-false control sentences.
A different pattern of N400 responses was predicted for
corresponding counterfactual sentences in Experiment 2but not for real-world sentences. If counterfactual conse-
quences are computed incrementally such that proposi-
tional truth-value impacts semantic processing without
delay, a comparable N400 effect of truth-value should be
observed in real-world sentences and counterfactual sen-
tences. In the abovementioned example, the incremental
interpretation involves the deduction that what holds for
dogs holds for Dobermans (for review, see Johnson-Laird,
1999), and an inductive inference regarding the type of
niche that could be suitable for a dog with gills (e.g., Rips,
1975; for accounts of this process in terms of conceptual
blending see Coulson & Fauconnier, 1999; Lakoff, 1987;
Turner & Fauconnier, 1998). Alternatively, the gradual
build-up of the counterfactual context may not eliminate
interpretive problems posed by semantically anomalous
consequences if build-up of the counterfactual context is
somehow slower and impact of truth-value therefore de-
layed (e.g., Fischler, Bloom, Childers, Roucos, & Perry,
1983; Kounios & Holcomb, 1992; Urbach & Kutas, 2010),
or because incoming statements are automatically mapped
onto real-world knowledge despite the counterfactual con-
text, in which case a smaller N400 effect of counterfactual
truth-value is expected than of real-world truth-value. This
would result from larger N400s to counterfactual-true
sentences than real-world-true sentences, but a delayed
Table 2
Example sentences and translations with average truth-value rating and CW cloze value (%) in Experiment 2.
Condition Example sentences Truth-value Cloze value
Counterfactual-true Si los perros tuviesen branquias, los Dóberman respirarían bajo el agua sin problemas 5.86 (0.89) 0.65 (0.20)
Si la sangre tuviese sobre todo cloroﬁla, una gota de sangre sería de color verde mayormente
Si los vegetales tuvieran mucha nicotina, los tomates podrían crear adicción fácilmente
If dogs had gills, Dobermans would breathe under water without problems
If blood had mostly chlorophyll, a drop of blood would be the color green mainly
If vegetables had a lot of nicotine, tomatoes could cause addiction easily
Counterfactual-false Si los perros tuviesen branquias, los Dóberman respirarían bajo el veneno sin problemas. 1.96 (0.83) 0
Si la sangre tuviese sobre todo cloroﬁla, una gota de sangre sería de color blanco mayormente.
Si los vegetales tuvieran mucha nicotina, los tomates podrían crear ilusión fácilmente
If dogs had gills, Dobermans would breathe under poison without problems
If blood had mostly chlorophyll, a drop of blood would be the color white mainly
If vegetables had a lot of nicotine, tomatoes could cause hope easily.
Real-world-true Como los peces tienen branquias, los atunes respiran bajo el agua sin problemas 6.00 (0.94) 0.69 (0.22)
Como la ﬂora tiene sobre todo cloroﬁla, una hoja de abeto es de color verde mayormente
Como el tabaco tiene mucha nicotina, los cigarros pueden crear adicción fácilmente
Because ﬁshes have gills, tuna breathe under water without problems.
Because ﬂora has mostly chlorophyll, a ﬁr tree’s leaf is the color green mainly
Because tobacco has a lot of nicotine, cigarettes can cause addiction easily
Real-world-false Como los peces tienen branquias, los atunes respiran bajo el veneno sin problemas 1.66 (0.71) 0
Como la ﬂora tiene sobre todo cloroﬁla, una hoja de abeto es de color blanco mayormente
Como el tabaco tiene mucha nicotina, los cigarros pueden crear ilusión fácilmente
Because ﬁshes have gills, tuna breathe under poison without problems
Because ﬂora has mostly chlorophyll, a ﬁr tree’s leaf is the color white mainly
Because tobacco has a lot of nicotine, cigarettes can cause hope easily
Filler Cada país tiene su moneda oﬁcial, en Europa la mayoría de países usa el euro
La mayoría de las drogas son ilegales, en España sólo el tabaco y el alcohol son legales.
Hay transportes contaminantes y ecológicos, la bicicleta no contamina en absoluto.
Every country has its ofﬁcial currency, in Europe the majority of countries uses the euro.
The majority of drugs are illegal, in Spain only tobacco and alcohol are legal.
There is polluting and ecological transportation, bicycles do not pollute at all.
Note: Standard deviations in parentheses. Critical words are underlined for expository purposes. For truth-value rating, 1 = False, 7 = True.
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N400s to counterfactual-false sentences compared to
real-world-false sentences.Experiment 1
Methods
Development and pretest of materials for Experiment 1 and 2
150 Spanish sentence quadruplets were constructed
that each consisted of two counterfactual sentences and
two real-world sentences. Critical words were never sen-
tence-ﬁnal and could be nouns, verbs or predicates. Coun-
terfactual-true sentences described the hypothetical
consequences of a premise that was inconsistent with
physical or biological facts of the world, involving charac-
teristics of animate beings, inanimate objects, substances
or events. In real-world-true sentences these animate
beings or inanimate objects were replaced with alternative
lexical items to make them consistent with real-world
knowledge (e.g., ‘‘If dogs had gills, Dobermans would
breathe under water’’ > ‘‘Because ﬁsh have gills, tuna
breathe under water’’). Counterfactuals started with theconditional ‘Si’ and involved conditional verb tense,
whereas real-world sentences started with ‘Como’ (‘since/
because’) and did not contain conditional verb tense. False
sentences were created by replacing critical words in true
sentences with words that rendered them both false.
A sentence completion test was performed to establish
the expectedness of true critical words. Twenty students of
the University of the Basque Country completed one of two
lists with one version of each sentence truncated before
the critical word. They were instructed to complete sen-
tences with the ﬁrst sensible word coming to mind. Cloze
value was computed as the percentage of participants
who used the true critical word.
A subsequent rating pretest examined whether sen-
tences (truncated after the critical word) were regarded
as true or false. Twenty different students evaluated one
of four lists of sentences so they saw only one condition
per quadruplet, and decided for each sentence whether it
was true (1 = False, 7 = True), skipping any they could not
evaluate.
Based on these results, quadruplets were excluded
when they had low cloze value (<.33), contained true/false
sentences rated below/over 3.5, or containing sentences
skipped by more than two participants. In the ultimate
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mentary Materials, along with the ﬁller sentences), true
and false sentences had relatively similar cloze values
and truth-value ratings across conditions (see Table 2;
truth-value ratings for the counterfactual-true and real-
world-true sentences did not differ reliably (t(1,95) = 1.3,
n.s.), but real-world-true cloze value was slightly higher
than the counterfactual-true cloze value (t(1,95) = 2.08,
p < .05), and counterfactual-false ratings were slightly
higher than real-world-false ratings (t(1,95) = 3.52,
p < .05). Critical words were matched for mean log fre-
quency (True/False = 1.31/1.26; Davis & Perea, 2005) and
word length (True/False = 6.7/6.4 letters, range 3–11
letters).
LSA semantic similarity values (SSV; see Landauer &
Dumais, 1997) for the critical words were obtained using
version 2 of the Gallito software (http://www.elsemanti-
co.com; Jorge-Botana, León, Olmos, & Hassan-Montero,
2010; Jorge-Botana, Olmos, & Barroso, 2012). This software
uses a large training corpus to create representations of
words and relationships between them within a multi-
dimensional semantic space. Those representations are,
importantly, insensitive to word order, syntax and overall
propositional meaning. SSVs were obtained by cosine com-
parison of the critical word vector with the sentence vector
(the sum of all word-vectors in the sentence) (counterfac-
tual-true: M = .15, SD = .12; real-world-true: M = .18,
SD = .21; counterfactual-false: M = .11, SD = .10; real-
world-false: M = .10, SD = .10). Critical words in true
sentences elicited higher similarity values than in false
sentences (F1,84 = 17.74, p = .001, CI .058 ± .016), and there
was a reliable truth-value by factuality interaction effect
(F1,84 = 5.61, p = .02). Follow-up comparisons showed that
the effect of truth-value was stronger in real-world sen-
tences (F1,84 = 13.20, p < .001, CI .08 ± .02) than it was in
counterfactual sentences (F1,84 = 5.94, p < .05, CI
.036 ± .015). Moreover, real-world-true sentences elicited
marginally higher values than counterfactual-true sen-
tences (F1,84 = 3.7, p = .058, CI .037 ± .019).
Materials from Experiment 1 were based on those from
Experiment 2 by omitting the ﬁrst clause of the sentences
and capitalizing the ﬁrst letter of each second clause. A
new pretest was performed to determine whether sen-
tences (truncated after critical words) were regarded as
true or false (see Table 1). Sixteen students who had not
participated in other pretests evaluated one of four coun-
terbalanced lists of sentences so they saw one condition
per quadruplet, and decided for each sentence whether it
was true (1 = False, 7 = True), skipping sentences they could
not evaluate. No new cloze test was administered because 3
out of 4 conditions were on average rated as false, whereas
the between-experiment comparison of real-world-true
sentences (which may have differed in cloze value) per se
was not relevant to the current hypothesis.
For the ERP experiment, four lists were created so that
each of the 96 sentences appeared in only one condition
per list, but in all conditions equally often across lists.
Within each list, items were mixed with 120 ﬁller sen-
tences. The ﬁller sentences were always consistent with
real-world knowledge, and consisted of one clause (see
Table 1).Participants
Twenty right-handed students (10 males; mean
age = 21.2 years) gave written informed consent. All were
native Spanish speakers, had no neurological or psychiatric
disorders, nor had they participated in any of the pretests.
Procedure
Participants read sentences from a monitor (black let-
ters, light gray background), presented word-by-word
(400 ms word duration, 200 ms inter-word-interval). Sen-
tence-ﬁnal words were followed by a ﬁxation cross upon
which participants could start the next sentence, or by a
yes/no comprehension question that probed related
knowledge. These 60 questions (30 requiring a ‘yes’ but-
ton-press response, average accuracy M = 81% accuracy,
SD = 9.1) were distributed across sentence types (e.g., ﬁller
sentence: ‘‘The most famous comic books are the ones
about superheroes’’, question: ‘‘Is Superman a super-
hero?’’). Participants completed a practice-session and six
break-separated experimental sessions. Total time-on-task
was 40 min.
Electroencephalogram recording, data processing and
statistical analysis
The electroencephalogram (EEG) was recorded from 27
scalp electrodes (Fz, Cz, Pz, Fp1/2, F3/4, F7/8, FC1/2, FC5/6,
C3/4, T7/8, CP1/2, CP5/6, P3/4, P7/8, O1/2, each referenced
to the left mastoid; one additional right mastoid electrode
and four additional electro-oculogram electrodes), ampli-
ﬁed (band-pass ﬁltered at 0.01–30 Hz), and digitized at
250 Hz. Impedance was kept below 5 kX. After re-refer-
encing to the average of the left and right mastoid elec-
trodes, ocular artifacts were corrected using a procedure
based on independent component analysis, and single-trial
waveforms were screened for artifacts during 1000 ms
epochs (starting 150 ms before critical word onset). Four
participants were excluded due to excessive artifacts (trial
loss > 40%). For the remaining 16 participants, average
ERPs (normalized by subtraction to a 150-ms pre-stimulus
baseline) were computed over artifact-free trials per condi-
tion (average percentage of included trials = 93%,
range = 88–97% across the four conditions).
First, using average amplitude per condition across all
EEG electrodes a 2(factuality: counterfactual, real-world)
 2(truth-value: true, false) repeated measures analysis of
variance (ANOVA) was performed in consecutive 100 ms
time windows between 250 and 650 ms after critical word
onset. All conﬁdence intervals are at an alpha level of 0.05.
Then, additional analyses were performed to explore the
scalp distribution of the observed effects and to reveal
potential scalp distribution differences between observed
effects in counterfactual sentences and real-world sen-
tences. Electrodes were grouped into quadrants according
to hemisphere (left or right of the midline) and
according to whether they were anterior or posterior to
the crossline, thus excluding midline and crossline elec-
trodes (left-anterior: FP1, F3, F7, FC1, FC5; right-anterior:
FP2, F4, F8, FC2, FC6; left-posterior: CP1, CP5, P3, P7, O1;
right-posterior: CP2, CP6, P4, P8, O2). For each of
the time windows, a 2(factuality: counterfactual control,
real-world control)  2(truth-value: true control, false
F3 FZ F4
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Counterfactual-False Control minus Counterfactual-True Control 
Real-world-False Control minus Real-world-True Control 
Fig. 2. Difference waves for Experiment 1 (counterfactual-false control
minus counterfactual-true control sentences, real-world-false control
minus real-world-true control sentences).Results
Critical words elicited more negative N400s in counter-
factual-false control sentences and real-world-false control
sentences compared to real-world-true control sentences
(see Fig. 1), visible at most electrodes. Importantly, coun-
terfactual-true control sentences elicited N400s that fol-
lowed those elicited by false control sentences at most
electrodes, but elicited only slightly increased N400s com-
pared to real-world-true control sentences at posterior
electrodes (see Fig. 2).
The repeated measures ANOVAs conﬁrmed that coun-
terfactual control sentences elicited more negative ERPs
than real-world control sentences between 250 and
350 ms (F1,15 = 6.21, p < .05, CI .85 ± .34), between 350
and 450 ms (F1,15 = 4.97, p < .05, CI .94 ± .42). In addition,
false control sentences overall elicited larger N400s than
true control sentences between 350 and 450 ms
(F1,15 = 19.81, p < .001, CI 1.63 ± .37), between 450 and
550 ms (F1,15 = 25.76, p < .001, CI 1.57 ± .31), and be-
tween 550 and 650 ms (F1,15 = 4.78, p < .05, CI .71 ± .33).
However, this true–false effect differed reliably between
counterfactual and real-world sentences in the 350 and
450 ms time window (F1,15 = 8.12, p < .012) and marginally
between 450 and 550 ms (F1,15 = 3.68, p < .01). Follow-up











Counterfactual-True Control: Dobermans would b
Counterfactual-False Control: Dobermans would 
Real-world-True Control: Tuna breathe under wa
Real-world-False Control: Tuna breathe under po
Fig. 1. Electrophysiological effects of truth-value in counterfactual control and
grand average event-related potentials elicited by critical words per condition at
is plotted upwards and waveforms are ﬁltered (5 Hz high cut-off, 12 dB/oct) for
world Spanish sentences that were either true or false (translated examples are p
counterfactual-true-control sentences are not considered true but this conditionand 450 ms and between 450 and 550 ms, counterfac-
tual-true control sentences elicited more negative ERPs




reathe under water without problems.   
breathe under poison without problems. 
ter without problems.
ison without problems.       
real-world control sentences in Experiment 1. The waveforms show the
nine selected electrodes. In this and all following graphs, negative voltage
presentation purpose only. Stimuli consisted of counterfactual and real-
rovided below the graphs with corresponding condition labels). Note that
label is used to facilitate the between-experiment comparison.
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14.43, p < .01, CI 1.25 ± .33), and real-world-false control
sentences elicited more negative ERPs than real-world-
true control sentences (350–450: F1,15 = 23.38, p < .001, CI
2.58 ± .53; 450–550: F1,15 = 21.75, p < .001, CI
2.24 ± .48).
Scalp distribution analyses
Between 350 and 450 ms, a signiﬁcant truth-value con-
trol by anteriority interaction effect was observed
(F1,15 = 7.55, p < .05): false control sentences elicited more
negative ERPs compared to true control sentences at pos-
terior electrodes (F1,15 = 27.65, p < .001, CI 2.06 ± .39)
than they did at anterior electrodes (F1,15 = 9.10, p < .01,
CI 1.2 ± .39).
Between 450 and 550 ms, a signiﬁcant factuality by
truth-value control by anteriority by hemisphere 4-way
interaction was observed (F1,15 = 4.82, p < .05): a statisti-
cally reliable truth-value control by factuality interaction
effect was only observed at left-posterior channels
(F1,15 = 6.46, p < .05) and right-posterior channels
(F1,15 = 4.78, p < .05). At left-posterior and right-posterior
channels, counterfactual-true control sentences elicited
more negative ERPs than real-world-true control sentences
(left: F1,15 = 17.27, p = .001, CI 1.22 ± .29; right:
F1,15 = 12.72, p < .01, CI 1.20 ± .34) and real-world-false
control sentences elicited more negative ERPs than real-
world-true control sentences (left F1,15 = 35.55, p < .001,
CI 2.81 ± .47; right F1,15 = 26.46, p < .001, CI 2.93 ± .57).
Only at right-posterior channels, however, did counterfac-
tual-false control sentences elicit more negative ERPs than
counterfactual-true control sentences (F1,15 = 14.94,
p < .01, CI 1.49 ± .39).
Discussion
As predicted, counterfactual-true control sentences
elicited N400s that were larger than those in real-world-
true control sentences, and that were comparable to
N400s to the false control sentences. These results there-
fore established that an N400 effect of truth-value could
be obtained despite the conditional verb tense. It must be
noted that counterfactual-true control sentences elicited
N400 responses that were less pronounced at parietal-
occipital electrodes than N400 responses to the false con-
trol sentences, and the difference between counterfac-
tual-true control and real-world-true control sentences
was therefore more centrally distributed than is common
for N400 modulations (e.g., Kutas et al., 2006). It is unclear
why this difference occurred, because frontally distributed
N400 effects are not generally reported for sentence read-
ing paradigms, although sometimes for spoken sentence or
picture comprehension (e.g., Kutas & Federmeier, 2011;
Kutas et al., 2006).Experiment 2
As outlined in the Introduction section in more detail,
the aim of Experiment 2 was to show an effect of proposi-
tional truth-value in unrealistic counterfactual conditionalsentences. Effectively, this means that the supportive con-
text offered by the counterfactual premise should preclude
the larger N400 responses that were seen to counterfac-
tual-true control sentences compared to real-world-true
sentences in Experiment 1. Moreover, no ERP differences
were predicted for counterfactual-false and real-world-
false sentences, replicating the observed pattern to the cor-
responding control sentences in Experiment 1.
Methods
Stimulus materials
Four lists were created so that each of the 96 full sen-
tences appeared in only one condition per list, but in all
conditions equally often across lists. Within each list, items
were mixed with 120 ﬁller sentences. The ﬁller sentences
were always consistent with real-world knowledge, did
not start with ‘Si’ or ‘Como’, and consisted of two clauses
separated by a comma (see examples in Table 2).
Participants
20 Right-handed students (11 males; mean age = 20.9 -
years) gave written informed consent. All were native
Spanish speakers, had no neurological or psychiatric disor-
ders, nor had they participated in any of the pretests or in
Experiment 1.
Procedure
The ﬁrst clause was presented for 4000 ms, during
which participants were allowed to blink or move, fol-
lowed by a blank screen for 500 ms. The duration of the
ﬁrst clause was based on the average number of words in
that clause (6.9 words), such that whole-clause presenta-
tion would – on average – be faster than word by word
presentation while taking into account that participants of-
ten needed to read the clause across two lines. The second
clause was presented word-by-word (400 ms word dura-
tion, 200 ms inter-word-interval). Sentence-ﬁnal words
were followed by a ﬁxation cross upon which participants
could start the next sentence or by a yes/no simple com-
prehension question that probed world knowledge related
to the preceding sentence. These 60 questions were in-
cluded to keep participants more alert during the experi-
ment (30 requiring a ‘yes’ button-press response, average
accuracy M = 82% accuracy, SD = 9.7), and were distributed
across sentence types (e.g., ﬁller sentence: ‘‘Many people
like to read comic books, the most famous comic books
are the ones about superheroes’’, question: ‘‘Is Superman
a superhero?’’). Participants completed a practice-session
and six break-separated experimental sessions. Total
time-on-task was approximately 50 min.
Electroencephalogram recording, data processing and
statistical analysis
Recording, processing and analysis of the EEG data oc-
curred identically to in Experiment 1. 2 participants were
excluded due to excessive artifacts (trial loss > 40%). For
the remaining 18 participants, average ERPs (normalized
by subtraction to a 150-ms pre-stimulus baseline)
were computed over artifact-free trials per condition
62 M.S. Nieuwland / Journal of Memory and Language 68 (2013) 54–67(average percentage of trials = 96%, range = 95–97%
across conditions).
The statistical analyses that were performed were sim-
ilar to those reported for Experiment 1, but the variable la-
bel ‘truth-value control’ was changed into ‘truth-value’. In
addition, 2(truth-value: true, false)  2(factuality: coun-
terfactual, real-world)  2(experiment: experiment 1,
experiment 2)  2(anteriority: anterior, poster-
ior)  2(hemisphere: left, right) repeated measures ANO-
VAs were performed to test for statistical differences
between Experiment 1 and Experiment 2 for each time
window. Greenhouse–Geisser correction was used for F
tests with 2 or more degrees of freedom. Additional
2(truth-value: true, false)  2(factuality: counterfactual,
real-world)  2(experiment: experiment 1, experiment 2)
ANOVAs were performed using the average voltage per
condition at midline electrodes (FZ, CZ, Pz) and at crossline
electrodes (T7/8, C3/4).Results
Critical words elicited larger (more negative) N400s in
the counterfactual-false and real-world-false sentences
compared to counterfactual-true and real-world-true sen-
tences (see Fig. 3), this pattern is visible at all electrodes.
These N400 effects of truth-value in counterfactual and
real-world sentences started at about 200 ms after critical
word onset, dissipated before 800 ms, and had a broad cen-
tral distribution (see Fig. 4). Statistical analyses using all
electrodes conﬁrmed that critical words in false sentences
elicited more negative ERPs than true sentences between
250 and 350 ms (F1,17 = 34.97, p < .001, CI 1.5 ± .27), be-
tween 350 and 450 ms (F1,17 = 82.24, p < .001, CI
3.4 ± .38), between 450 and 550 ms (F1,17 = 58.37,














Counterfactual-True: If dogs had gills, Dobermans wo
Counterfactual-False: If dogs had gills, Dobermans w
Real-world-True: Because fish have gills, tuna breath
Real-world-False: Because fish have gills, tuna breat
Fig. 3. Grand average event-related potentials elicited(F1,17 = 20.81, p < .001, CI 1.50 ± .33). Crucially, there
was no signiﬁcant main effect of factuality (F < 1 for factu-
ality in all time windows), and the effect of truth-value did
not differ for counterfactual and real-world sentences in
any time window (F < 1 for all truth-value by factuality
interactions).Scalp distribution analyses
Between 350 and 550 ms, false sentences elicited more
negative ERPs compared to true sentences at posterior
electrodes (350–450: F1,17 = 93.31, p < .001, CI
3.63 ± .38; 450–550: F1,17 = 91.69, p < .001, CI
3.80 ± .40) than they did at anterior electrodes (350–
450: F1,17 = 53.30, p < .001, CI 2.97 ± .41; 450–550:
F1,17 = 27.17, p < .001, CI 2.70 ± .52). Between 550 and
650 ms, false sentences elicited more negative ERPs com-
pared to true sentences at right-hemisphere electrodes
(F1,17 = 28.71, p < .001, CI 1.72 ± .32) than they did at
left-hemisphere electrodes (F1,17 = 11.24, p < .01, CI
1.20 ± .36).Between-experiment analyses
The main purpose of the between-experiment analyses
was to establish that the experiments yielded a reliably
different pattern of results for the interaction between
truth-value and factuality. Using all electrodes, the truth-
value by factuality by experiment 3-way interaction was
marginally signiﬁcant between 350 and 450 ms
(F1,32 = 3.23, p < .1). In this time window, the truth-value
by factuality by anteriority by experiment 4-way interac-
tion was fully signiﬁcant (F(1,32) = 7.94, p < .01). Follow-
up revealed that the truth-value by factuality by experi-
ment 3-way interaction was only statistically signiﬁcant
at anterior electrodes (F(1,32) = 4.56, p < .05), consistent
with the observation that the between-experiment4
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Counterfactual-False minus Counterfactual-True 
Real-world-False minus Real-world-True 
Fig. 4. Difference waves for Experiment 2 (counterfactual-false minus
counterfactual-true sentences, real-world-false minus real-world-true
sentences).
M.S. Nieuwland / Journal of Memory and Language 68 (2013) 54–67 63differences in N400 modulations across conditions were
most pronounced at anterior electrodes (reﬂecting the
stronger interaction for true/false control and factuality
at anterior channels in Experiment 1).
Between 450 and 550 ms, the truth-value by factuality
by anteriority by hemisphere by experiment 5-way inter-
action was fully signiﬁcant (F(1,32) = 4.34, p < .05), consis-
tent with the earlier observations of a signiﬁcant factuality
by truth-value control by anteriority by hemisphere 4-way










Fig. 5. ERP waveforms at Cz for high-cloze and moderate-cloze counter-
factual-true and real-world-true sentences in Experiment 2.Additional analyses of cloze probability
Further analyses focused on the inﬂuence of cloze prob-
ability on N400 activity (350–450 ms time window) elic-
ited by the counterfactual-true and real-world-true
sentences. These analyses aimed to show that a compari-
son of counterfactual-true and real-world-true sentences
would (1) yield similar results of factuality in sentences
with high cloze probability and in sentences with moder-
ate cloze probability when cloze probability was matched
between factual and counterfactual conditions, but (2)
yield an overall larger N400 for moderate cloze sentences
as compared to high cloze sentences. This was accom-
plished by dividing the item-set in two subsets based on
an approximate median-split of the average cloze proba-
bility for counterfactual and real-world sentences: one
set had a relatively high average cloze probability
(M = .83, SD = .09) and the other set had a relatively moder-
ate average cloze probability (M = .49, SD = .10). The two
sets of items were matched in terms of critical word lengthand log frequency, as well as on the truth-value ratings of
the counterfactual-true and real-world-true sentences (all
Fs < 2.2, n.s.).
The results for a representative electrode Cz are shown
in Fig. 5. For the statistical analysis, averages were com-
puted over the more centrally located electrodes that are
most sensitive to N400 activity (F3/F4, C3/C4, P3/P4, Fz,
Cz, Pz, FC1/2, CP1/2, FC5/6, CP5/6). A 2(factuality: counter-
factual, real-world)  2(average cloze: high, moderate)
ANOVA conﬁrmed that critical words in low cloze sen-
tences elicited more negative ERPs in the N400 time win-
dow than in high cloze sentences (F1,17 = 4.51, p < .05, CI
1.29 ± .55), and that this pattern was similar for counter-
factual and real-world sentences.Discussion
This ERP experiment examined comprehension of coun-
terfactual and real-world sentences varying in truth-value.
N400 effects of propositional truth-value were obtained in
counterfactual and real-world sentences, and these effects
had the typical central-posterior, slightly right-lateralized
N400 effect distribution (e.g., Kutas et al., 2006). Impor-
tantly, ERPs for counterfactual-true and real-world-true
sentences fully overlapped (as did the counterfactual-false
and real-world-false sentences) and associated N400 ef-
fects were statistically indistinguishable.
Of note, the absence of an N400 difference between
counterfactual-true and real-world-true sentences is unli-
kely to be the result of lexical-associative priming. Lexical
co-occurrence analysis showed that the critical words had
greater semantic similarity to the real-world context than
to the counterfactual context, while critical words had
greater similarity to true contexts than to false contexts.
This reﬂects that, on average, words like ‘water’ are more
similar to the combination of ‘ﬁsh’-‘tuna’-‘gills’-‘breathe’
than to the combination of ‘dogs’-‘gills’-‘Dobermanns’-
‘breathe’, whereas ‘poison’ would be much less similar to
these combinations. This makes sense in terms of the
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semantic memory (e.g., Collins & Loftus, 1975) and the lit-
erature on summation priming in word lists (e.g., Balota &
Paul, 1996). The current ERP results thus suggest that the
N400 is not solely sensitive to such lexical priming but
can reﬂect interpretation at a message-level representation
of the discourse (e.g., Camblin, Gordon, & Swaab, 2007;
Camblin, Ledoux, Boudewyn, Gordon, & Swaab, 2007;
Nieuwland & Kuperberg, 2008; Nieuwland & Martin,
2012; Otten & Van Berkum, 2007; see also Traxler, Foss,
Seely, Kaup, & Morris, 2000).
These results, in particular the fact that counterfactual-
true sentences did not incur any visible semantic process-
ing costs upon encountering the critical words over
real-world-true sentences, suggest that the counterfactual
context completely eliminated the interpretive problems
posed by the semantically anomalous consequence, and
that incoming words can therefore be mapped without
any delay onto the interpretive context.2 However, one can obtain plausibility ratings for sentences of which
truth-value cannot be established, e.g., ‘‘He spread the warm bread with
socks’’), whereas it would be infelicitous to ask for the plausibility (rather
than truth-value) of straightforwardly false sentences (e.g., ‘‘The capital of
France is London’’) unless participants are instructed to rate how plausible
it is that somebody would utter this sentence.General discussion
Two ERP experiments examined electrophysiological
responses to propositional truth-value of sentences about
biologically or physically unrealistic counterfactual worlds
(e.g., Spanish equivalents of ‘‘If dogs had gills, Dobermans
would breathe under water/poison’’, true/false) or of real-
world sentences (‘‘Because ﬁsh have gills, tuna breathe un-
der water/poison’’, true/false). Experiment 1 established
that without the counterfactual premise (e.g., ‘‘Dobermans
would breathe under water/poison’’, false/false, versus
‘‘Tuna breathe under water/poison’’, true/false), each type
of false sentence elicited larger N400 responses than true
sentences. In Experiment 2, participants read the counter-
factual or real-world-true/false sentences with the
supportive context. Counterfactual-false sentences and
real-world-false sentences elicited similar N400 responses,
which were reliably larger than their counterpart true sen-
tences in both contexts, suggesting that incorporation of
the counterfactual context eliminated the interpretive
problems posed by locally anomalous sentences.
The results suggest that, even in sentences that describe
impossible events, if counterfactual consequences are suf-
ﬁciently plausible given the premise then ongoing seman-
tic processing is impacted by propositional truth-value
without an observable delay or disruption. This is inconsis-
tent with accounts of discourse comprehension that as-
sume a context-free level of semantic analysis based on
local lexical-semantic associations that precedes (whether
in a cascaded or in a pure serial manner) a phase in which
implications for the wider context are computed (e.g. Kin-
tsch, 1988; Myers & O’Brien, 1998). The results are also
inconsistent with accounts of language comprehension
that assume a temporal delay in contextual effects specif-
ically in sentences with logical operators such as negation
and scalar quantiﬁers (e.g., Fischler et al., 1983; Kounios &
Holcomb, 1992) and counterfactuals (e.g., Carpenter, 1973;
Carpenter & Just, 1975). Instead, the results are consistent
with theories of language comprehension that do not as-
sume a delayed contribution of discourse context (seeCook & Myers, 2004). The results provide further evidence
that people effortlessly map incoming utterances onto
what they think is true and what they consider relevant
(e.g., Hagoort et al., 2004; Nieuwland & Kuperberg, 2008),
and may reﬂect how contextual constraints guide expecta-
tions about upcoming input (e.g., Delong, Urbach, & Kutas,
2005; Federmeier, 2007; Kutas, DeLong, & Smith, 2011;
Van Berkum, 2009).
The immediate impact of propositional truth-value in
counterfactual sentences about unrealistic worlds, as re-
ported here, contrasts with several reports in the literature
that pitted contextual relevance with real-world truth-va-
lue (e.g., Hald et al., 2007) or real-world possibility (e.g.,
Ferguson & Sanford, 2008; Ferguson et al., 2008; Warren
et al., 2008). As noted in the Introduction, these other re-
ports may have involved a context that rendered an impos-
sible consequence mildly congruent, yet still less
predictable or plausible than a possible consequence. It
has long been established that the N400 is strongly corre-
lated to predictability, with its amplitude being inversely
correlated to cloze probability (e.g., Delong et al., 2005; Ku-
tas & Hillyard, 1984; see also Federmeier & Kutas, 1999;
Otten & Van Berkum, 2008; Van Berkum et al., 2005). A
post hoc analysis was conducted to disentangle effects of
factuality from those of predictability, by comparing
N400 effects in counterfactual and real-world sentences
with a relatively high cloze value to those in sentences
with a relatively moderate cloze value: whereas the
N400 was reliably modulated by cloze value (larger N400
for moderate cloze sentences), the effect of factuality was
not affected by cloze value (reﬂecting the matching of
cloze value for counterfactual and real-world sentences
within each subset). Thus, the observed pattern seems
not to be contingent on high predictability of the critical
words, and future research could further elucidate this is-
sue by examining the comprehension of counterfactual
sentences with low-predictable critical words that are
rated as equally plausible or true compared to a real-
world-true control (although these may be difﬁcult to con-
struct: see Frisson, Rayner, & Pickering, 2005; Matsuki
et al., 2011, for discussion). In contrast, earlier work has
shown that N400 effects of truth-value are not observed
in literally true but pragmatically infelicitous sentences
that, effectively, are zero-cloze. At the very least, the cur-
rent results are most probably contingent on having coun-
terfactual and real-world sentences that are matched on
contextual constraint leading up to critical words, and on
the plausibility or truth-value as rendered by the critical
words. In this study, truth-value ratings are effectively
similar to plausibility2 ratings (‘‘If X, how plausible is Y?’’).
The present studies addressed the impact of counterfac-
tual truth-value at the critical words, but this only repre-
sents a snapshot of counterfactual processing, and could
not tap directly into the construction of the counterfactual
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that comprehension of counterfactual sentences is func-
tionally identical to or ‘‘as easy’’ as with regular sentences,
but, rather, that the implications of the counterfactual con-
text and real-world context have both been computed such
that propositional truth-value directly impacted online
semantic processing at the critical word. It is thus very well
possible, and perhaps plausible, that the setting-up itself of
a counterfactual context is more costly than that of a real-
world context. Additionally, the current study does not
have straightforward implications for theories of counter-
factual reasoning, which are concerned with the balance
between (and activation patterns of) counterfactual and
factual representations (e.g., Byrne, 2002; Evans, 2006). It
remains an open and important question how contextual
constraints build-up as participants process language,
and how readers construe the counterfactual world to
serve as a context for interpretation. In the following sec-
tion I will brieﬂy describe what this could entail.
Constructing a counterfactual context
An initial interpretation of a counterfactual premise
might follow the particular constraints of the conceptual
combination that is required (e.g., ‘‘If blood contained chlo-
rophyll’’; see Costello & Keane, 2000; Springer & Murphy,
1992; for accounts in terms of conceptual blending, see
Coulson, 2001; Coulson & Fauconnier, 1999; Coulson &
Oakley, 2005). Readers might not consider information
that undermines coherency of the counterfactual world
(e.g., that high levels of chlorophyll in blood are potentially
deadly to animals and humans, and that blood would not
be blood if it contained mostly chlorophyll, see Murphy &
Medin, 1985), as part of the ‘suspension of disbelief’ re-
quired for such sentences (e.g., Searle, 1975). Readers
might instead focus on the most diagnostic and plausible
changes by the counterfactual scenario as compared to
the real-world. For example, because chlorophyll is
strongly associated with photosynthesis as well as with
being that what makes plant green, it is possible that the
counterfactual premise leads readers to think about one
or both of the following things: animals can now do photo-
synthesis, and blood has the color green. Guided by the
unfolding sentence and presentation of ‘‘the color’’, readers
can narrow down to the most relevant consequences. Per-
haps that a dedicated follow-up study could reveal pro-
cessing differences already before any inﬂuence of
propositional truth-value would be expected (e.g., at the
word ‘color’).
Counterfactual sentence comprehension thus seem to
involve online reasoning and inferencing. In the current
items, counterfactual consequences were about a noun
phrase that was never identical to the noun phrase intro-
duced in the premise but always constituted a subset
thereof (e.g., ‘Dobermans’ following ‘dogs’), requiring a
deductive inference (what is true for dogs is true for
Dobermans) and inductive inference (likelihood that dogs
with gills would indeed breathe under water). The latter
inference might, similar to reasoning about the premise,
require suspension of disbelief: people might consider that
having gills is predictive of living under water (see Murphy& Ross, 2010; Osherson, Smith, Wilkie, Lopez, & Shaﬁr,
1990), whereas because dogs are not great swimmers they
might not survive under water and would nevertheless be
better off living as land-animals with gills (having gills
does not mean they cannot also have lungs). This does
not necessarily mean that participants actively suppress
these kinds of thoughts; they might simply not become
aware of inconsistencies as they read, especially if they
are not informative or relevant to the unfolding discourse
(see also Evans, 2006). The current pattern of results might
not hold true, however, for individuals who apply real-
world knowledge more rigidly during language compre-
hension (e.g., Morsanyi & Handley, 2012; Scott, Baron-Co-
hen, & Leslie, 1999).Conclusion
People are able to establish whether a sentence is hypo-
thetically true despite knowledge that what it describes
can never be true given the biological or physical laws of
the world. The present study examined brain responses
to propositional truth-value of counterfactual conditional
Spanish sentences about such unrealistic worlds. In con-
trast to earlier ﬁndings regarding comprehension of sen-
tences with logical operators (e.g., Fischler et al., 1983)
and comprehension of counterfactual language (e.g., Fer-
guson et al., 2008; Warren et al., 2008), the present results
show that when described consequences are sufﬁciently
plausible given an unrealistic counterfactual premise,
ongoing semantic processing is directly impacted by prop-
ositional truth-value.
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